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Premature deindustrialisation is a threat to low- and middle-income countries, as it shrinks 
their opportunities for technological development, and their capacity to add value in global 
value chains and tradable sectors, thereby ultimately reducing their scope for productivity 
increases. This paper investigates the specific industrialisation challenges faced by middle-
income countries today and provides global and regional evidence for the different premature 
deindustrialisation trajectories that countries have followed, with a specific focus on South 
Africa. Against this background, the paper develops an industrial policy framework highlighting 
three main aspects, namely (i) the importance of selecting appropriate instruments targeting 
specific production, technological and organisational challenges; (ii) the need for coordinating 
these instruments in coherent industrial policy packages; and, finally, (iii) the governance 
challenges that middle-income countries will face in managing these policy instruments. The 
challenges in implementing and governing complex industrial policy packages are highlighted 
by reviewing successful sectoral interventions in Brazil, China and Malaysia. Country and 
sectoral cases are finally used to extract a number of industrial policy implications for South 
Africa.   
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Over the past two decades, the world economy has undergone profound structural 
transformations. Despite a number of catching-up economies having registered fast economic 
growth during this period, world industrial production has remained highly concentrated. 
Today, fewer than twenty countries control 80% of the world manufacturing value-addition 
activities. Many low- and middle-income countries are not part of this group of industrialised 
nations, and indeed many of those countries that have managed to reach middle-income 
status have shown signs of premature deindustrialisation. South Africa is one of these middle-
income countries.  
 
Premature deindustrialisation is a threat to low- and middle-income countries, as it shrinks 
their opportunities for technological development, and their capacity to add value in global 
value chains and tradable sectors, thereby ultimately reducing their scope for productivity 
increases. In order to reverse this trend and run the risk of falling behind in the global industrial 
landscape, appropriate packages of industrial, technological and innovation policies have to 
be deployed. These are essential economic policy tools for escaping the middle-income trap, 
increasing domestic value addition and, more critically, reversing the processes of premature 
deindustrialisation.  
 
The effectiveness of industrial policy in addressing premature deindustrialisation in middle-
income countries critically depends on the specific features of the industrial system. Indeed, 
countries that are traditionally classified in the group of middle-income countries are highly 
heterogeneous with respect to their premature deindustrialisation experiences. Benchmarking 
South Africa against international industrial performance and policy experience offers an 
opportunity to identify those countries facing similar challenges and to assess the extent to 
which their policy responses are feasible in the South African context, both from economic 
and political economy perspectives.  
 
This paper investigates the specific industrialisation challenges faced by middle-income 
countries today and provides global and regional evidence for the different premature 
deindustrialisation trajectories that countries have followed, with a specific focus on South 
Africa. Against this background, the paper develops an industrial policy framework highlighting 
three main aspects, namely (i) the importance of selecting appropriate instruments targeting 
specific production, technological and organisational challenges; (ii) the need for coordinating 
these instruments in coherent industrial policy packages; and, finally, (iii) the governance 
challenges that middle-income countries will face in managing these policy instruments.  
 
Particular emphasis is placed on the identification of clusters of industrial policy instruments 
that have been implemented successfully in middle-income countries. The challenges in 
implementing and governing complex industrial policy packages through different stages of 
industrialisation are highlighted by reviewing three country cases, namely Brazil, China and 
Malaysia. In-depth analysis of successful sectoral interventions for each of these countries are 
also presented to highlight specific design, implementation and enforcement mechanisms 
adopted by these countries. The paper concludes by sketching a number of industrial policy 
implications for South Africa, in particular with respect to the premature deindustrialisation 
challenges and the need for a more integrated industrial policy framework.  
 




Section 2 discusses the issue of the ‘middle-income trap’ and the challenges that middle-
income countries face in industrialising during the current period. Particular attention is given 
to the concentration of industrial production among a small number of countries, to challenges 
around integration into global value chains (GVCs), and to the challenges of keeping pace 
with technological changes. Section 3 presents an empirical analysis of selected global 
evidence on the phenomenon of premature deindustrialisation, situating South Africa in an 
international comparative perspective. Section 4 focuses on industrial policy options for 
middle-income countries to avoiding (or reversing) premature deindustrialisation and escaping 
the middle-income trap. This draws on three diverse country case studies: Brazil, China and 
Malaysia. Section 5 concludes by considering policy implications of the analysis for South 
Africa. 
 
2. Middle-income Trap and Industrialisation Challenges 
 
The world’s middle-income countries (MICs) are a heterogenous group of countries divided in 
two main groups, that is lower middle-income economies (those with a GNI per capita between 
$1 006 and $3 955) and upper middle-income economies (those with a GNI per capita 
between $3 956 and $12 235). Middle-income countries are home to five of the world’s seven 
billion people (and 73% of the world’s poor people) and generate one third of global GDP 
(World Bank, 2018). 
 
In recent years, a number of low and high middle-income countries have witnessed a slow-
down of their economic growth after reaching middle-income levels. Indeed, as stressed by 
the World Bank, only 13 of 101 middle income economies in 1960 had become high-income 
economies by 2008 (World Bank, 2013). This phenomenon – characterised as the ‘middle-
income trap’ – has raised significant concerns among policymakers in countries such as 
China, Brazil, Malaysia and South Africa.  
 
The concept of the ‘middle-income trap’ was introduced in a research report by the World Bank 
titled An East Asian Renaissance: Ideas for Economic Growth (2007). In this report, Gill and 
Kharas coined the idea of the middle-income trap in the following passage:  
 
In the absence of economies of scale, East Asian middle-income countries would face an 
uphill struggle to maintain their historically impressive growth. Strategies based on factor 
accumulation are likely to deliver steadily worse results, which is a natural occurrence as 
the marginal productivity of capital declines. Latin America and the Middle East are 
examples of middle-income regions that, for decades, have been unable to escape this 
trap (Gill & Kharas, 2007:18; italics added). 
 
Despite the term ‘middle-income trap’ itself largely remaining under-theorised, it has since 
been used widely in the development literature and policy discourse to describe stagnant 
growth in both absolute and relative terms. It suggests a situation of long-term stagnating 
equilibrium in terms of per capita income and, thus, the failure to maintain sustained economic 
growth towards the high income level of developed countries. For example, Arias and Wen 
(2015) define an ‘income trap’ as the phenomenon of an economy’s aggregate income per 
capita failing to grow faster than that of the US, which is taken as benchmark of the developed 
world. A situation in which an economy’s income per capita relative to the US remains 




constantly and substantially below 50% is called a (relative) middle-income trap. These 
authors refer to (relative) low-income trap (or poverty trap) in cases when it remains 
significantly below 10%. 
 
An increasing number of studies have attempted to identify and measure the middle-income 
trap and its global structural dynamics (see Wade (2016) for a review of these studies). In 
particular, they have focused on providing different explanations for the underlying causes of 
this phenomenon. Among them, a number of specific industrialisation challenges faced by 
middle-income countries have been identified. 
 
First, and in a relatively general sense, scholars have pointed to the challenges that middle-
income countries face in sustaining labour productivity growth over a long period of time. For 
example, Justin Lin (2016:6) suggests that “[t]he middle-income trap is a result of a middle-
income country’s failure to have a faster labor productivity growth through technological 
innovation and industrial upgrading than high-income countries”.  
 
Second, other scholars (see for instance Lee, 2013; Williamson, 2012) argue that a source of 
the middle-income trap is the difficulty of these countries competing with low-wage and large-
scale exporters. At the same time, they cannot compete with technologically advanced 
economies because their industrial capabilities are not yet sufficiently developed to give them 
a competitive advantage. 
 
Third, if we embrace the idea that manufacturing industries play a critical role in boosting 
productivity, value addition and technological change, premature deindustrialisation could be 
another factor responsible for the phenomenon of the middle-income trap. Countries 
experience premature deindustrialisation when deindustrialisation has begun at a lower level 
of GDP per capita, and/or at a lower level of manufacturing as a share of total employment 
and GDP, than is typically the case internationally. Many of the cases of premature 
deindustrialisation are in sub-Saharan Africa, in some instances taking the form of ‘pre-
industrial deindustrialisation’ (Tregenna, 2015). 
 
According to various indicators of industrial competitiveness, South Africa is stuck in the 
middle-income countries segment, and has shown signs of an ongoing process of premature 
deindustrialisation. Over several decades, the annual growth rate of the manufacturing sector 
has slowed down dramatically, thereby affecting the absolute manufacturing value addition 
produced in the country. As a result of this premature deindustrialisation process, if we 
benchmark South Africa’s export performances against that of other middle-income countries, 
we also find that gross export value has increased since 2000, but at a much slower pace than 
major comparator countries.  
 
Moreover, trade relationships between South Africa and the new industrial giants have mainly 
reinforced the ongoing structural processes of premature deindustrialisation. Over the past 
decade, China and India have emerged as the top two destinations of South Africa’s 
intermediate exports, while China became South Africa’s largest supplier of imports in 2009. 
By 2011, imports from China were already above 12% of total imports and were 
overwhelmingly of manufactured goods, while South Africa’s exports remained mainly 
composed by natural resources – i.e. mining and basic metals.  
 




Figure 1 compares the evolution of South Africa’s GDP per capita with that of the three 
comparator countries discussed here (Brazil, China and Malaysia). This throws South Africa’s 
long-term structural problems into stark relief. In 1960 South Africa had by some distance the 
highest level of GDP per capita in the group. Brazil’s GDP per capita was 76% that of South 
Africa, that of Malaysia was 29%, and that of China just 4% that of South Africa. South Africa 
retained its leading position until 1972, after which it was overtaken by Brazil. Malaysia 
overtook South Africa in 1993, and China will overtake South Africa this year.  
 
It is true that virtually all countries would show up poorly when benchmarked against China’s 
long-run growth miracle, especially the past three decades of unprecedented rapid and 
sustained growth in China. Yet South Africa performs poorly when compared not just against 
the comparator countries shown here, but against all relevant country groupings and 
aggregates. This underscores the long-term structural deficiencies of South Africa’s economy 
and growth trajectory, and the extent to which it is stuck in its middle-income position and in 
fact falling down the global rankings in GDP per capita. 
 
Figure 1: South Africa, Brazil, China and Malaysia – GDP per capita 1960-2017 
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (WB WDI) 
 
The literature on the middle-income trap thus points to several industrialisation challenges that 
are intertwined, and that reinforce each other in different ways along different countries’ 
structural trajectories. These challenges also present potential opportunities for middle-
income countries to industrialise and develop. In the analysis that follows, we suggest the 
need to go deeper in our understanding of these industrialisation challenges by considering 
the specific structural factors responsible for the middle-income trap – ‘global concentration’, 
‘linking up’ and ‘keeping pace’ – and explicitly distinguishing different ‘premature 
deindustrialisation trajectories’. Indeed, capturing this set of factors, and how they unfold in 




different countries along different structural trajectories, is a key step towards designing 
appropriate industrial policy for middle-income countries. 
 
2.1 Global concentration of manufacturing production 
 
Over the last two decades, the global industrial landscape has been reshaped by profound 
structural transformations. These dramatic transformations started in the mid-1990s and led 
to the ‘great convergence’ between the most industrialised nations and a relatively small group 
of fast catching-up economies.  
 
Between 1995 and 2010, the G7 countries lost significant shares of value addition. In 
particular, their shares in world manufacturing value added (WMVA) registered a major 
decline. In 1995, the two leading industrial nations – the United States and Japan – together 
contributed more than 40% of WMVA, while Germany, Italy, France and the UK contributed 
another 25%. South Korea and Canada controlled another 2% of WMVA each at that time. 
This means that fewer than ten nations controlled more than 70% of the world manufacturing 
landscape in 1995. By 2011, less than 15 years later, all the G7 countries together accounted 
for only 40% of the WMVA, although their manufacturing value added in absolute terms kept 
increasing steadily until the 2007 financial crisis.  
 
During the same period, between 1995 and 2010, emerging economies increased their total 
value addition from 13% to 27%, and their joint WMVA shares from 18% to 36% (Figure 2). 
This process of convergence has been driven by the rise of the new industrial superpower – 
China – and a group of fast catching-up economies. China moved from contributing less than 
5% of WMVA in 1995 to 10% in 2005, and more than 20% in 2011, to reach a peak of almost 
23% in 2014. As a result, China’s share in world value-added exports surged to 17% in 2014, 
seven percentage points ahead of the second world-leading exporter – Germany – and more 
than double that of the United States. 
 




Figure 2: The great convergence 
 
Source: Authors, based on TiVA OECD 
Note: “OtherTop16” includes countries other than G7 which are in the top16 for Manufacturing Value 
Added produced in 2011: China, Korea, Brazil, India, Russia, Indonesia, Mexico, Spain, Turkey. 
Taken all together – G7 plus OtherTop16 – only 16 countries account for the 80% of the world Total 
MVA produced in 2011. 
 
Between 2000 and 2010, India, Russia and Brazil almost doubled their WMVA shares to 
overcome the 2.5% threshold in WMVA shares, while Indonesia approached almost 2% by 
2010. A number of upper middle-income countries – including Malaysia and South Africa – 
were only marginally involved in this great convergence, as reflected in their WMVA shares. 
Indeed, some of them are today facing a middle-income trap often linked to processes of 
premature deindustrialisation. 
 
We thus see ongoing concentration of manufacturing production amongst a relatively small 
group of countries. The G7 countries no longer command the same high share of global 
manufacturing as was previously the case, yet their share remains high. The next tier of 
emerging manufacturers – shown here as the group of 16 – have to some extent closed the 
gap with the advanced economies. Even this emerging group is itself highly concentrated. 
Still, it demonstrates the possibilities of breaking into the group of leading manufacturing 
nations.  
 
Against this persistent concentration in the global industrial landscape, South Africa has faced 
a fundamental challenge in increasing its domestic value addition (DVA) in manufacturing 
industries and exported products. DVA in manufacturing products captures the extent to which 




a country is able to add value to its produce. The value addition can be the result of several 
types of activity, including extracting and processing raw materials; designing a product; 
producing components; integrating or assembling product systems; and adding services to 
products downstream in the value chain.  
 
To capture the extent to which a country has engaged in value addition activities, it is critical 
to measure only the net value addition, thus excluding the value that results from buying goods 
and services from abroad. In South Africa, the net DVA declined among all major 
manufacturing subsectors between 1995 and 2008 (Figure 3). Some recovery was registered 
after 2008, for example in the machinery and equipment industries. Direct exports by the 
mining industry generated the greatest source of domestic value added in 2011, accounting 
for 24.6% of the total value added of exports. The next three most important industries were 
wholesale, retail & hotels (10.2%), basic metals (9.3%), and transport & telecommunications 
(5.4%).  
 




Source: Authors, based on TIVA 
 




2.2 Linking up: Challenges in global value chain integration 
 
Domestic value-added performances reflect the extent to which countries have been able to 
build up their industrial capabilities and take advantage of the opportunities offered by forward 
integration into global value chains (GVCs). Between 1990 and 2010, African countries 
experienced limited gains from GVC integration and declining forward integration (and 
domestic value addition) in international trade. While the value of world imports more than 
doubled during the 2000s, with intermediate goods making 65% of world imports in 2011, 
much of Africa’s participation in GVCs has developed in upstream production (backward 
integration). This upstream GVC specialisation has been coupled with a declining downstream 
integration since 1995. South Africa has seen an increase in backward integration, measured 
as the share of foreign value added in export, from 17% in 1995 to 30% in 2011 (Figure 4).  
 






Source: Authors, based on TIVA 
 
Middle-income countries like South Africa face the difficulty of moving into more 
technologically sophisticated segments of GVCs, often remaining stuck in the middle-income 
trap. By middle-income countries joining RVCs or GVCs, focusing on the production of low-
value added parts and components, might risk ‘de-linking domestically’ and hollowing out of 
the domestic manufacturing sector. Under these conditions, a combination of weak 
productivity growth and rising labour costs, or the emergence of alternative lower-cost 
locations, might lead to declining profitability, disengagement by the lead firm and a further 
weakening of domestic productive capacity. 
 
In contrast, by linking up local producers and local supply chains to international companies 
and system integrators – local production system development – domestic companies can 




capture international demand and learn from exporting (Andreoni, 2018). South Korea and 
Taiwan, between 1970 and 1990, and China in the 1980s and 1990s, all started their 
industrialisation by linking (backwards) to global supply chains and adding value (forwards) in 
electronics and other industries, starting in particular from those characterised by short-
technology cycles. With the expansion of the local production system through downstream 
(forward) integration, more opportunities for backward integration also open up, as domestic 
companies will start importing more intermediate goods while diversifying their export baskets. 
 
Global value chain upgrading is the process of improving the ability of a firm or an economy 
to move to more profitable and/or technologically sophisticated capital and skill-intensive 
economic niches. Upgrading can take different forms, including: 
 
i. Process upgrading, which typically refers to improved production methods that 
transform inputs into final products more efficiently through the reorganisation of 
production or the introduction of superior technology; 
ii. Product upgrading, which is moving into more sophisticated product lines in terms 
of higher unit-value products, rather than moving to a different part of the value 
chain;  
iii. Functional upgrading, which involves performing new, superior functions in the 
chain, such as design or marketing, or abandoning existing low value-added 
functions to focus on higher value-added activities;  
iv. Intersectoral upgrading, which entails applying the competence acquired in a 
particular function or industry to move into a new sector. For instance, Taiwan used 
its competence in producing televisions to make monitors and then to move into 
the computer sector. 
 
The GVC framework stresses the opportunities for companies (and local production systems) 
to specialise in specific production tasks or components, preferably ‘high-value niches’, while 
avoiding the building up of entire vertically integrated industrial sectors or blocks of industries 
(Gereffi, 2013; Milberg & Winkler, 2013). The idea of a selective form of specialisation in tasks, 
driven by capturing value opportunities, would encourage companies to focus on activities 
such as research and development (R&D), design and downstream post-sale services, while 
dismissing more ‘traditional’ (at least so perceived) manufacturing processes. 
 
Although this literature has revealed important aspects of modern manufacturing, it also 
presents a number of limitations. Two of these are critical for the development of our 
understanding of the challenges facing middle-income countries, while more issues have been 
raised in other contributions (Andreoni, 2018; Chang & Andreoni, 2016).  
 
First, in order to capture ‘high-value niche’ opportunities along the value chain via tasks 
specialisation, companies often require multiple sets of complementary production capabilities 
that cut across multiple stages of the value chain and different technology domains (Figure 5). 
This is increasingly so in the case of complex high-tech high-value products or components. 
For example, the task specialisation in design often requires direct access in the same local 
industrial ecosystems to specific production capabilities for prototyping and manufacturing to 
scale up products and processes. This means that task specialisation requires the 
identification of complementary sets of capabilities that constitute the technology platform 
underpinning the task or set of related tasks.  





Traditionally, these sets of capabilities were developed within vertically integrated firms 
(Penrose, 1959), or within industrial blocks.2 The possibility for firms in a certain location to 
develop a competitive advantage in a certain task/stage, and thus to capture a ‘high-value 
niche’, will depend on complementary sets of different capabilities whose development might 
require involvement in more than one stage of the same (or other) value chains. In successful 
industrial ecosystems, like the Boston route (Best, 1990, 2013) and the Emilia Romagna 
region (Andreoni, 2018a, 2018b; Andreoni et al., 2017), these complementary capabilities 
have developed along different cycles of industrial transformation and the renewal of vertically 
integrated firms, backed up by a dense network of local specialised suppliers and contractors. 
 




Source: Andreoni (2018a) 
 
A second problem in the GVC approach is that it has increasingly become a-sectoral, that is, 
it has led to the undermining of a number of specificities of industrial sectors (or groups of 
industrial sectors). Given the structural heterogeneity characterising industries, in particular 
manufacturing sectors (Andreoni & Chang, 2016), we can expect that the value creation and 
capture opportunities are in fact distributed in different ways across value chains in different 
sectors. This is why the complete abandonment of the sectoral heuristic might be problematic. 
In other terms, while vertically integrated sectors are poor heuristics to understand the modern 
network/value chain mode of production, these networks and value chains still are 
fundamentally heterogeneous and present specific features in terms of their modularity, their 
                                               
2 According to Dahmen (1989:132), the development block “refers to a sequence of complementarities which by 
way of a series of structural tensions, i.e., disequilibria, may result in a balanced situation”. The emergence of 
development blocks may be either the result of ex-post ‘gap filling’, whereby a ‘structural tension’ or bottleneck is 
solved, or the result of an ex-ante ‘creation of markets’ by coordinated entrepreneurial activities or ‘economic 
planning’ by government institutions. As documented in the history of the steel industry (Dahmen, 1989) or in the 
empirical analysis of other Swedish industries (Enflo et al., 2007 adopt cointegration analysis), development blocks 
trigger the cumulative dynamics of regional differentiation in technological and other factor endowments. 




length and distribution across countries, and the underpinning set of technological capabilities. 
The value chain ‘shape’ and ‘length’ depend on multiple factors, including specific sectoral 
and organisational features, as well as the combination of complementary capabilities – i.e. 
technology platforms – required to execute tasks in the different stages of the chain, and these 
tasks tend to be different across sectors. For example, the aerospace and medical device 
sectors are both characterised by complex technology platforms, as both produce multi-
thousands of ‘critical system products’.  
 
Intersectoral upgrading is becoming an increasingly important process, given that modern, 
high-value manufacturing activities rely on cross-cutting technology systems. Different 
technology systems, such as biotechnologies, advanced materials, microelectronics and 
automation, enable multiple production activities (also processes and tasks as their 
components) in different manufacturing industries. By nurturing the development of these 
complementary sets of capabilities, the scope for technological innovation within and across 
sectors – thus intra- and inter-sectoral upgrading – tends to increase and new development 
trajectories are potentially built.  
 
2.3 Keeping pace: Challenges of technological change and preconditions  
 
Technological change at the innovation frontier – the so-called Industry 4.0 – has increasingly 
been recognised by lower- and middle-income countries as a critical competitive factor for 
global value chain upgrading and a leapfrogging opportunity. Sectoral value chains are based 
on different technology platforms integrating various types of technologies and technology 
systems (see Figure 6). As eloquently documented in Tassey (2010:6):  
 
Most modern technologies are systems, which means interdependencies exist among 
a set of industries that contribute advanced materials, various components, 
subsystems, manufacturing systems and eventually service systems based on sets of 
manufactured hardware and software. The modern global economy is therefore 
constructed around supply chains, whose tiers (industries) interact in complex ways.  
 
This means that some of these technology platforms underpin the production processes of 
closely related industrial sectors as well as different product-value segments within the same 
industrial sector. Technologies are thus linked by a set of dynamic interlocking relationships 
spanning across sectors and value-product segments. 
 




Figure 6: Tassey’s classification of different technology types 
 
 
Source: Tassey (2007) 
 
The emergence of these dynamic interdependencies, as well as the technology transition from 
one type of technology platform to another, tends to follow cyclical patterns. Often, these 
technology transitions open new value-product segment opportunities for business 
organisations. The existence of technology cycles is particularly evident in relation to 
technology transitions underpinning firms’ shifts from mature product segments to higher 
value-product segments within the same industrial sector (Andreoni et al., 2017).  
 
The identification (and development) of key technology systems can follow different criteria 
(and policies) associated with different technology properties: 
 
i. their being ‘transversal’, that is, the extent to which they are deployed in multiple 
sectoral supply chains 
ii. their degree of ‘embeddedness’, that is, the extent to which they play a critical role 
within integrated technology systems 
iii. their ‘quality-enhancing potential’, that is, the extent to which they allow increasing 
quality products and their functionalities 
iv. their ‘productivity-enhancing potential’, that is, the extent to which they affect 
production processes’ productivity 
v. their being ‘strategic’, in terms of facing major social and economic future 
challenges or markets 
 
In the economic literature, technologies and technology systems responding to a number of 
these properties (especially the transversal one) have been associated with the concept of 
general purpose technologies (GPTs). GPTs have been studied especially with reference to 
the emergence of new technology paradigms and their broader impact on the economy (for a 
review, see Bresnahan, 2010; Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2005). 





Starting from 2010, European Union (EU) technology and industrial policy has identified and 
focused its interventions on a set of key technologies and technology systems characterised 
by more than one of the properties highlighted above. These are:  
• Advanced materials (AM) 
• Advanced manufacturing systems (AMS) 
• Industrial biotechnology (IB) 
• Photonics (PH) 
• Micro- and nano-electronics (MNE) 
• Nanotechnology (NT) 
 
Given their transversal nature, high potential and strategic role, these technologies have been 
called Key Enabling Technologies (KETs).  
 
KETs are knowledge and capital-intensive technologies associated with high research 
and development (R&D) intensity, rapid and integrated innovation cycles, high capital 
expenditure and highly-skilled employment. Their influence is pervasive, enabling 
process, product and service innovation throughout the economy. They are of systemic 
relevance, multidisciplinary and trans-sectorial, cutting across many technology areas 
with a trend towards convergence, technology integration and the potential to induce 
structural change. 
 
KETs are technologies/technology systems underpinning the development of today’s most 
complex products – in particular smart devices that are able to interact with their users, 
collecting and using data (Internet of Things, IoT) and performing multiple services. KETs are 
also central to different technology platforms underpinning supply chains of different types. 
Thus, they are deployed transversally within the industrial ecosystem, and across the different 
types of sectoral supply chains listed above. 
 
Middle-income countries like South Africa run the risk of undermining the ‘technological 
preconditions’ that have to be met in order to capture value opportunities from technological 
change. For example, to make investments in ICT and digital solutions valuable, investments 
in the production capacity and hardware and organisational capabilities must be in place. In 
particular, the integration of digital technologies and networks with robotics and autonomous 
systems requires investments in key technology sub-systems and components, including 
automation and m2m technologies, embedded software, sensors and human interfaces, and 
augmented reality. These emerging technologies are expected to reshape the industrial plant 
of the future, making processes faster and more responsive, while reshaping the nature of 
jobs and skills. 
 
3. Premature deindustrialisation – South Africa in international comparative 
perspective  
 
In this section, we empirically analyse deindustrialisation trends across countries. This 
explores the patterns and dynamics of deindustrialisation internationally, in particular 
premature deindustrialisation, and locates South Africa in the context of these trends. 
 




First, we econometrically estimate the relationship between countries’ GDP per capita and 
their shares of manufacturing in total employment. Second, based on this simple regression 
analysis, we identify the level of GDP per capita and share of manufacturing in total 
employment associated with the ‘turning point’, at which the share of manufacturing levels off 
and begins to decline. Third, we conceptualise a characterisation of possible country 
experiences based on countries’ changes in share of manufacturing in total employment, and 
on whether their actual share of manufacturing in total employment is higher or lower than the 
regression analysis would predict. Fourth, we categorise countries based on these two 
dimensions. Finally, combining this with data on countries’ 2015 level of GDP per capita and 
manufacturing employment share allows us to identify possible premature deindustrialisers. 
Throughout, particular attention is drawn to the case of South Africa. 
 
We begin this part of the analysis by analysing the relationship between GDP per capita and 
the share of manufacturing in total employment. This part of the method follows Rowthorn 
(1994), Palma, (2005, 2008) and Tregenna (2015). Rowthorn (1994) identifies an inverted-U 
relationship between countries. That is, at higher levels of GDP per capita, the share of 
manufacturing in total employment typically rises, up to a turning point associated with a 
particular level of GDP per capita and share of manufacturing employment, after which 
manufacturing accounts for a declining share of total employment. Naturally, this is a stylised 
pattern based on data for many countries, and countries will inevitably have either a higher or 
lower actual employment share than would be predicted based on the regression analysis. 
 
We estimate the share of manufacturing employment in total employment as a function of 
GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared (all in natural logs). The inclusion of the squared 
term takes account of the expected non-linear relationship between the explanatory and 
independent variables. The analysis uses only the shares of manufacturing in total 
employment.3  
 
Data on GDP per capita and population is from the United Nations (UN) Main National 
Accounts database (UNMNA).4 Data on manufacturing share of employment is taken from the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) ILOSTAT database.5 The final sample comprises 148 
countries, with excellent coverage across regions and across levels of development.6 
                                               
3 A possible extension would also include the share of manufacturing in GDP. Both conceptually and empirically, it 
is important to consider both employment and GDP when analysing deindustrialisation (see Tregenna, 2009). 
Using employment shares only can give an incomplete and potentially misleading picture, especially where there 
are divergent productivity dynamics between countries. However, the econometric fit is much poorer for shares of 
GDP than for shares of total employment, which can confound this sort of analysis. 
4 https://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/Introduction.asp (UNMNA). GDP data is in current US$. 
5http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/ilostat-home/home?_adf.ctrl-state=97dmq1had_4&_afrLoop=410550119330777#. 
This database includes both actual data points and the ILO’s modelled estimates of missing values. Sectoral 
employment data is in general far less available and complete than data on sectoral shares of GDP, which has 
hampered the analysis of sectoral patterns in terms of employment by limiting country samples. This has also 
tended to introduce a bias, as employment data is generally especially poor for developing countries, which 
therefore have tended to be under-represented in this sort of analysis. Although the inclusion of estimated values 
in the ILOSTAT database could raise doubts around the accuracy of certain values (especially where imputations 
are undertaken for relatively long gaps in original data), its value lies in the wide country coverage. See also 
http://www.ilo.org/ilostat-files/Documents/description_ECO_EN.pdf and http://www.ilo.org/ilostat-
files/Documents/TEM.pdf. 
6 The initial sample includes 181 countries: these are all countries for which data is available on all variables for 
both 2005 and 2015. We exclude from the sample all countries with a population below one million people. This 
excludes from the analysis small island nations and other small countries, which may follow atypical development 
paths that can distort the analysis. We also exclude a further three countries identified as outliers (using Hadi’s 
method, with the significance level for outlier cut-off set at the default value of p(.05)). 





Econometric results are summarised in Appendix 1. The results satisfy the relevant diagnostic 
tests. The signs of the estimated coefficients are as expected in both periods, confirming the 
expected non-linear relationship between GDP per capita and manufacturing share of 
employment.  
 
It is worth noting that the explanatory power of this basic model is superior in 2005 compared 
to 2015, indicating that cross-country differences in GDP per capita explain less of the cross-
country differences in manufacturing share of employment in 2015.7 
 
This simple regression yields an estimated turning point for 2015 of approximately $17 000 
(2015 current US$). This level of GDP per capita corresponds (in this regression) to a 12% 
share of manufacturing in total employment. The curve is shown in Figure 7, which also 
indicates the turning point of the regression – the level of GDP per capita and associated share 
of manufacturing in total employment at which the latter levels off and subsequently begins to 
decline. 
 
Figure 7: Estimated relationship between GDP per capita and manufacturing share of 
employment, 2015 
 
Source: Authors based on UNMNA data 
Note: dashed lines indicate the turning point of the relationship. 
 
                                               
7 This in itself could be interesting to explore further in a separate paper, especially in terms of which other variables 
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Next, we categorise countries based on two dimensions. Firstly, whether their actual share of 
manufacturing in total employment in 2015 was higher or lower than would be ‘predicted’ 
based on their level of GDP per capita in 2015 and the estimated coefficients from the 
regression (that is, the sign of the residual term for each country). This dimension gives a 
sense of which countries may be ‘under-industrialised’ given their level of GDP per capita. 
Where this is positive, a country falls above the curve in Figure 7, and conversely where this 
is negative. Secondly, whether they experienced an increase or decrease in the share of 
manufacturing in their total employment between 2005 and 2015. This second dimension 
indicates which countries can be considered (simply on the basis of sectoral employment 
shares) to have deindustrialised during this period. Taken together, these two dimensions 
allow us to tentatively classify countries into four broad categories, depicted schematically in 
the four quadrants of Figure 8.  
 
It must be emphasised that this analysis is exploratory and indicative, rather than definitive.8 
It is thus only suggestive of which countries might be considered as deindustrialisers, and 
especially as premature deindustrialisers. A country being classified here as a ‘possible 
premature deindustrialiser’ does not necessarily confirm that it is indeed experiencing 
premature deindustrialisation; similarly, a country may actually be experiencing premature 
deindustrialisation despite not being classified here as a ‘possible premature deindustrialiser’.  
 
Quadrant I includes countries in which the share of manufacturing employment is higher than 
expected in 2015, and in which this share has grown between 2005 and 2015. Based on this 
analysis, these countries do not raise a concern in terms of deindustrialisation. Amongst the 
countries in this quadrant are low- and low-middle-income, fast-industrialising, fast-growing 
Asian countries such as Cambodia, Indonesia, India, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Countries in 
Quadrant 4 are also growing their share of manufacturing in total employment, which in 2015 
remains below their ‘expected’ values. Thus, even though these countries might be regarded 
as ‘under-industrialised’, they show evidence of industrialising during this decade. 
 
Countries falling in quadrants II and III can be characterised as possible deindustrialisers, in 
that their share of manufacturing in total employment fell between 2005 and 2015. Yet, in the 
case of Quadrant II countries, their manufacturing employment share in 2015 still remains 
above their ‘expected’ level.  
 
                                               
8 Reasons for circumspection in this regard include: that this is just one approach to conceptualising and measuring 
premature deindustrialisation; the inclusion of estimated values in the ILOSTAT database; limitations of the 
econometric methodology and specification (including the non-inclusion of explanatory variables other than GDP 
per capita and its squared term); the narrow range of the predicted values of manufacturing share of total 
employment; measurement of deindustrialisation only in terms of employment shares and not also shares in GDP; 
and sensitivity to the specific years used in the analysis. Furthermore, to reach more definitive conclusions, 
individual country-level analysis would be needed, taking into account country-specific dynamics. 




































































Countries in which: 
Share of manufacturing in total 
employment decreased (2005-2015) 
and 
Share of manufacturing in total 











Countries in which: 
Share of manufacturing in total 
employment increased (2005-2015) 
and 
Share of manufacturing in total 
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Countries in which: 
Share of manufacturing in total 
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and 
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From the standpoint of structural change and concerns around the impact of 
deindustrialisation on growth, it is the countries falling in Quadrant III that potentially raise 
more significant concerns. In these countries, the share of manufacturing in employment is 
lower than would be expected, and they have been further deindustrialising over the past 
decade. Rather than catching up to their ‘expected’ level of industrialisation, this group of 
countries has been falling further behind. Furthermore, some of these countries had a higher 
than expected level of industrialisation in 2005, but fell below the curve by 2015. 
 
The distribution of country points between the four quadrants is shown in Figure 9, with the 
location of South Africa specifically highlighted (‘SA’). South Africa falls in Quadrant III – the 
category of greatest potential concern in terms of deindustrialisation. Between 2005 and 2015, 




the share of manufacturing in South Africa’s total employment fell from 13.9% to 11.2% (based 
on the ILOSTAT data). Worth noting is that this is in fact only slightly below the expected value 
for 2015 based on South Africa’s GDP per capita and international patterns of widespread 
deindustrialisation, that is, South Africa’s share is actually close to its predicted value. 
 
The list of countries falling into each of the four categories on the basis of these indicative 
regression results is shown in Table 1. South Africa is highlighted, along with Brazil, China 
and Malaysia as the three countries discussed as case studies in section 4. Of particular 
interest is that these three comparator countries all fall in Quadrant II. Like South Africa, their 
share of manufacturing in total employment fell between 2005 and 2015. Yet, unlike the case 
of South Africa, their share of manufacturing in total employment remained higher than 
predicted in 2015. A key factor in this difference is that these three comparator countries began 
the period of analysis at relatively higher shares of manufacturing in total employment, for their 
levels of income per capita, than in the case of South Africa. 
 
Key statistics for South Africa, Brazil, China and Malaysia are shown in Table 2. South Africa 
had the lowest share of manufacturing in total employment in both 2005 and 2015. Moreover, 
as discussed, it is the only one among this cohort of countries to have a lower than predicted 
share of manufacturing in total employment in 2015 (albeit only slightly lower than predicted). 
Brazil’s actual share is only slightly higher than its predicted share, while in China and 
Malaysia the actual shares are well above predicted shares, indicating the high levels of 
industrialisation in the latter two countries. 
  
Figure 9: Scatterplot of country results 
 
Note: Each point in this scatterplot indicates a country’s change in the share of manufacturing in total 
employment (x-intercept) and difference between actual and predicted share of manufacturing in its 
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Table 1: Cross-country categorisation 



































































































































































Note: Countries listed in alphabetical order within each quadrant 
 
Table 2: South Africa and comparator countries 
 Actual share of manuf. 
in total employment 
2005 (%) 
Actual share of manuf. 
in total employment 
2015 (%) 
Difference btw actual & 
predicted share of 
manuf. in total 
employment 2015 (%) 
South 
Africa 
13.9 11.2 -0.1 
Brazil 14.2 12.5 0.7 
China 23.6 17.6 5.9 
Malaysia 19.8 16.5 4.6 
Source: Authors based on UNMNA data 
 
Next, we further divide Quadrant III countries into those that might be regarded as possible 
premature deindustrialisers. We identify which of these countries has GDP per capita in 2015 
below the turning point. That is, we classify possible premature deindustrialisers for 2015 as 
those countries in which: (1) the share of manufacturing in total employment fell between 2005 
and 2015; (2) the share of manufacturing in total employment in 2015 was less than would be 
expected based on their GDP per capita (i.e. they fell below the curve shown in Figure 7); and 
(3) their GDP per capita in 2015 was below the level of GDP per capita associated with the 
turning point in the relationship based on the pattern found across countries (i.e. they fell to 
the left of the turning point shown in Figure 7). As such, this set of countries excludes those in 
Quadrant III with levels of GDP per capita above the income turning point (i.e. advanced 
economies that are deindustrialising). This part of the analysis thus introduces a third 
dimension (to the left or right of the income turning point), in addition to the two dimensions 
portrayed in the earlier parts of this analysis), to identify the (potential) premature aspect of 
the deindustrialisation experiences internationally. 
 
These 33 ‘possible premature deindustrialisers’ are listed in Table 3, which also shows 
information on countries’ income and regional group classifications. Of this group, eight can 
be classified as low income, seven as lower-middle income, 15 as upper-middle income, and 
three as high income. In terms of regional distribution, almost half (14) are in sub-Saharan 
Africa. This is consistent with what Tregenna (2016) has described as a phenomenon of ‘pre-
industrialisation deindustrialisation’ in some (especially low-income) sub-Saharan African 
countries. Another nine are from Latin America and the Caribbean, six from Europe and 
Central Asia, two from the Middle East and North Africa, one from Southern Asia, and one is 
from East Asia and the Pacific. As discussed earlier, South Africa is amongst this Quadrant III 
group of possible premature deindustrialisers. 
 




Table 3: Possible premature deindustrialisers, 2005-2015  
 
Note: Countries listed in alphabetical order. 
Income and regional group classifications based on World Bank classification, income groups use 
2015 classification (see https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-
bank-country-and-lending-groups)  
Country Income group  Region  
Afghanistan Low South Asia 
Albania Upper middle Europe and Central Asia 
Angola Upper middle Sub-Saharan Africa 
Armenia Lower middle Europe and Central Asia 
Botswana Upper middle Sub-Saharan Africa 
Burundi Low Sub-Saharan Africa 
Cameroon Lower middle Sub-Saharan Africa 
Chile High 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Costa Rica Upper middle 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Cuba Upper middle 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Dominican Republic Upper middle 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Ecuador Upper middle 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Eritrea Low Sub-Saharan Africa 
Ethiopia Low Sub-Saharan Africa 
Georgia Upper middle Europe and Central Asia 
Ghana Lower middle Sub-Saharan Africa 
Iraq Upper middle 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
Jamaica Upper middle 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Kazakhstan Upper middle Europe and Central Asia 
Kyrgyzstan Lower middle Europe and Central Asia 
Mali Low  Sub-Saharan Africa 
Mauritania Lower middle Sub-Saharan Africa 
Namibia Upper middle Sub-Saharan Africa 
Oman High 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
Panama Upper middle 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Peru Upper middle 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Philippines Lower middle East Asia and Pacific 
Sierra Leone Low Sub-Saharan Africa 
SOUTH AFRICA UPPER MIDDLE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
Tajikistan Lower middle Europe and Central Asia 
Tanzania Low Sub-Saharan Africa 
Uruguay High 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Zimbabwe Low Sub-Saharan Africa 
 




4. Escaping from the Premature Deindustrialisation Trap: Industrial Policies for 
Middle-income Countries  
 
This section offers an industrial policy framework and an in-depth comparative review of three 
country case studies. For each of these, specific initiatives which have helped these countries 
in dealing with the specific industrialisation challenges highlighted above are also presented. 
The analysis shows what policies are relatively successful in supporting (re)industrialisation 
and overcoming the premature deindustrialisation trap. By describing key policy instruments 
(the ‘what’ and ‘how’ industrial policy) and the ways in which different countries have designed 
and implemented them in practice, this sections engages with a broad range of policy 
instruments focusing on five different policy areas.  
 
4.1 An industrial policy framework for middle-income countries: Instruments and 
governance challenges 
 
Industrial policymaking is a complex process, as it entails the management of multiple 
interactive measures and instruments (Andreoni, 2016). In his account of the lessons learned 
from East Asia, Stiglitz (1996) emphasises how these countries can only be understood by 
analysing their ‘packages of interactive measures’ in terms of which companies were exposed 
to different types of internal and external competitive pressures. This policy option is also 
stressed by Chang (2011:100) when he writes,  
 
In East Asia, free trade, export promotion (which is, of course, not free trade), and infant 
industry protection were organically integrated, both in cross-section terms (so there 
always will be some industries subject to each category of policy, sometimes more than 
one at the same time) and over time (so, the same industry may be subject to more 
than one of the three over time).  
 
Finally, in the context of Scandinavian countries, Landesmann (1992:242) stresses how these 
countries adopted an “interesting mix of both defensive and constructive policies”. 
 
Table 4 below provides a list of industrial policy instruments, organised around five key policy 
areas. These are: 
 
i. Production, technological and organisational capabilities building 
ii. Innovation and technological change 
iii. GVC integration, local production system (LPS) development and industrial 
restructuring 
iv. Demand and trade 
v. Industrial finance 
 
These areas have been selected as they match the critical challenges that countries in the 
middle-income status present, which might also lead to their premature deindustrialisation. A 
number of policy instruments are effective tools in addressing more than one policy area. The 
table also shows the extent to which the selected country cases have adopted these 
instruments, as well as other successful middle-income country cases. 
 










AREAS PREMATURE DEINDUSTRIALISATION AND MIDDLE 
INCOME TRAP CHALLLENGES
POLICY INSTRUMENTS Brazil China Malaysia Other           
country cases
1
PRODUCTION, TECHNOLOGICAL AND 
ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES BUILDING 1.1 SKILLS POLICY (TVET) x xx xxx Singapore
1.2
R&D&M INTERMEDIATE INSTITUTIONS AND 
EXTENSION SERVICES xxx xxx xxx
South Korea, 
Taiwan
1.3 & 2.1 MATCHIG GRANTS FOR INVESTMENTS xxx xx India
2 INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 2.2 PPP RESEARCH CONSORTIA WITH UNIVERSITIES xx xx xx South Korea 
2.3 JOINT VENTURES WITH TNC x xxx xxx Vietnam
3
GVC INTEGRATION, LPS DEVELOPMENT AND 
INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING 3.1
MERGERS AND ACQUISITION AND RECESSION 
CARTELS x xxx x South Korea
3.2 COMPETITION POLICY x
3.3 FDI INCENTIVES x xxx xxx Vietnam
3.4 LOCAL CONTENT POLICY xx xxx xxx Vietnam
3.5 SMEs INCENTIVES x xxx xxx India
3.6 CLUSTER POLICY x xxx xx India
3.7 & 4.1
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES / EXPORT PROMOTION 
ZONES x xxx xxx Indonesia
4 DEMAND AND TRADE 4.1
EXTERNAL DEMAND: TRADE POLICY / REGIONAL 
VCs x xxx xx
4.2 EXTERNAL DEMAND: EXPORT CARTELS xx x
4.3 INTERNAL DEMAND: PUBLIC PROCUREMENT xx xxx x
4.4 & 5.1 EXPORT ORIENTED: EXPORT FINANCE SERVICES xx xxx xx Thailand
5 INDUSTRIAL FINANCE 5.2 LONG TERM: DEVELOPMENT BANKS xxx xxx x India
5.3
SMALL SIZE: HYBRID/BLENDED 
FINANCE/GRANT/PROCUREMENT x xxx xx
5.4 PUBLIC: INVESTMENT POLICY xx xxx xx




As discussed in Andreoni (2016), the identification of a mix of policy instruments is only the 
first step. Indeed, these instruments must be aligned, coordinated and synchronised over time. 
Policy matrixes are useful tools in addressing the challenges faced by industrial policy makers 
in aligning and coordinating packages of interactive measures across different policy targets 
and areas. First, a policy matrix allows for mapping out the different policy instruments a given 
government is implementing. In doing so, policy matrixes provide a good basis for reflecting 
on the degree of targeting of each policy instrument and how it is governed. Secondly, the 
policy matrix helps in identifying the potential interactions linking the different policy 
instruments adopted by different ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) and 
implemented across different policy areas. Finally, by revealing the presence of policy 
interactions within the overall policy package, it is possible through the policy matrix to identify 
potential policy misalignment or trade-offs that would remain unnoticed otherwise. These 
misalignments might also be related to a lack of coordination or duplication among MDAs, as 
well as the fact that the instruments adopted by one government are not synchronised with 
those left by previous governments.  
 
The policy matrix proposed by Andreoni (2016) considers three main axes: 
 
i. Industrial policy governance model  
This axis defines the extent to which policies are implemented by MDAs at the regional/state 
level or at the national/federal level. Of course, as in the case of regional agreements such as 
the East Africa Community, there is also a supranational level of policy-making. 
 
ii. Industrial policy targets and areas 
Each industrial policy instrument targets a specific set of goals, which can be clustered in 
various policy areas. For example, R&D credit, standardisation policy and public technology 
intermediaries are all instruments/measures/institutions targeting the ‘Innovation and 
Technology Infrastructure’ policy area. While industrial policy generally relies on supply-side 
instruments, there are also clusters of policy areas, including demand-side type of instruments 
such as procurement policy and external market development policies.  
 
iii. Industrial policy levels of intervention. 
Each industrial policy instrument can be more or less selective. Some policy instruments are 
tailored as sector-specific measures, and can also target specific firms within those sectors 
(SMEs in the food supply chain, for example). Then there are policies that are focused on the 
manufacturing system as a whole, in particular those targeting export promotion or the 
development of technology platforms that are critical for manufacturing development (e.g. 
capabilities in machine tools). Some industrial policy instruments can focus more openly on 
cross-sectoral targets in the industrial system, for example, those targeting better integration 
between the agriculture and manufacturing industries. Finally, there are policies that are more 
macroeconomic in nature, such as interest rate and exchange rate policies. Despite the fact 
that they will affect the overall economy, this does not mean that they will affect all sectors of 
the economy in the same way. A certain interest rate policy will affect sectors with different 
degrees of capital intensity differently. 
 




Figure 10: Policy matrix for industrial policy package analysis 
 
 
Source: Andreoni (2016) 
 
Countries can adopt different packages of industrial policy measures and can coordinate 
different policy instruments, either to have a combined effect on the same target or to manage 
potential trade-offs among different goals. For example, education policies can be aligned with 
labour market reforms to improve workers’ conditions. Technology policies can also be aligned 
with trade policies or public procurement measures supporting domestic industrial sector 
development. Potential trade-offs arising between economic growth and increasing pressure 
on natural resources can be counterbalanced by aligning sectoral policies and technology 
policy, in particular the development and deployment of green technologies over time.  
 
In sum, the effectiveness of a single policy measure depends on its linkages with other policy 
measures acting upon the same companies, sectors and specific institutions. This implies that 
the policy effectiveness of a certain instrument might be improved by both/either using the 
instruments more effectively and/or by changing or introducing other complementary 
instruments. The combined effect of different policy instruments tends to be different from the 
one that the government can achieve by the independent implementation of the same policy 
measures in time. 
 
The governance of industrial policy as packages of interactive measures presents several 
challenges, which are particularly severe in middle-income countries like South Africa. 
Industrial policy governance challenges are due to multiple factors and dynamics that operate 
and unfold in three areas: (i) the public sector, (ii) the interaction between public MDAs and 
private sector constituencies, and (iii) the private sector among different powerful groups and 
interests. 
 




Governance challenges in the public sector 
 
Within the public sector, the government is articulated in different MDAs operating at both the 
national and sub-national levels. A number of these institutions are settled to perform critical 
industrial policy functions, allocating rents in the form of subsidies, licensees, tax exemptions 
etc. However, in some countries, public department and agencies have been often 
proliferating as a result of political processes of consensus and clientelist network building. 
This means that, despite their official mandate, these institutions do not de facto perform any 
specific industrial development and productive capabilities-building function. In some extreme 
cases, they are not simply ineffective, but they can actually become rigidities in the 
government institutional structure and strong forces resisting any change.  
 
Another critical governance challenge in the public sector is related to the fact that the 
mandate of some government institutions is often unclear, and duplication across MDAs is 
very common. As a result, when policymakers attempt to design instruments for productive 
capacities building, they often face a highly dysfunctional and rigid institutional structure. This 
is particularly the case when the implementation of certain policy instruments cannot be 
prescinded from inter-MDA coordination. The reason why reforming these institutional and 
governance structures is particularly difficult is related to the fact that MDAs are often focused 
on preserving their policy space and resources, thus they are not willing to restructure 
institutions or reduce duplications. In particular, MDAs compete for protecting and eventually 
increasing the resources they have been allocated from the central government budget.  
 
Governance challenges and political economy dynamics in the interaction between 
public and private sectors 
 
The relationship between the government and the private sector matters. Experience shows 
the importance of continuous dialogue and exchange of information between the two if the 
policies are going to be well informed and relevant. However, it is also important that the 
government does not become beholden to particular industrial interests and thus to avoid the 
danger of ‘capture’. Peter Evans (1995) has captured this point with the notion of ‘embedded 
autonomy’, which means that the government needs to have roots in society 
(‘embeddedness’), but also has to have its own will and power (‘autonomy’) in order to be 
effective in its intervention.  
 
Historically, countries with a strong landlord class or a strong financial capitalist class have 
found it difficult to implement good industrial policy, as those classes want policies that could 
be detrimental to the development of productive capacities. One such prominent example is 
the US landlords in the South, who, up until the Civil War, constantly exerting pressure for free 
trade, despite the fact that it would have deterred the development of the country’s 
manufacturing sector. In the more recent period, we have seen the strong financial capitalist 
classes of the UK and Brazil wanting policies that lead to overvalued exchange rates, thereby 
destroying large swathes of their export-oriented manufacturing industries.  
 
In understanding the relationship between the government and the private sector, it is critical 
to start from assessing the distribution of organisational power in both the public and private 
sectors – thus, the countries’ “political settlement” (Khan, 2010) – and the relationship between 
powerful organisations (including elites and intermediate groups) operating in both (and at the 




interface between) the public and private sectors. Khan (2010:4) defines the political 
settlement as “a combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and also 
sustainable in terms of economic and political viability”. The analysis of a country’s political 
settlement allows for the assessment of the feasibility of certain policy intervention and, thus, 
the extent to which a certain policy instrument can be implemented and enforced in a given 
political settlement.  
 
Governance challenges and political economy dynamics in the private sector 
 
The private sector in LDCs is characterised by a limited number of industrialists capable of 
investing in a competitive market setting and a plurality of big players involved in trading 
activities, construction and services (Andreoni, 2018; Khan et al., 2016). The lack of medium-
sized companies and the dominance of micro- and small enterprises, often operating 
informally, complete the private sector scenario in LDCs. In such a business environment, 
power is concentrated mainly in the hands of big players in the importing, construction and 
service industries. These players tend to have interest that conflict with those of industrialists 
and other SMEs, for example with respect to competition for the internal market. 
 
Private sector investment in productive capacities building is particularly difficult in developing 
countries, as the distribution of power and the incentive structure discourage productive 
investments. Given the lack of productive capacities, importing produce from other countries 
tends to be cheaper and less risky. Moreover, investments in productive activities is perceived 
to be riskier than operating in the construction or services industries. As a result, financial 
capital and interest rates mostly favour the latter sectors, and investments in productive 
activities remain limited in scale and scope. Finally, given the lack of medium-sized 
companies, the few big industrialists are able to squeeze their local supply chains, which 
remain disarticulated and incapable of reaching an efficient scale. 
 
Industrial policy for productive capacities building can play a central role in transforming the 
private sector and moving towards a more balanced distribution of power. By mobilising 
resources towards productive forces in the private sector, and creating incentives for the 
building up of the local production system, industrial policy can make productive investments 
feasible and profitable. However, to be effective, the design, implementation and enforcement 
of industrial policy must take into consideration what the specific resources and incentives are 
that different players along different sectoral value chains will need to become more 
productive. The governance of industrial policy at the sectoral value chain level often requires 
close coordination and strategic alliances between productive forces in both the public and 
private sectors. From the perspective of government, industrial policy must have a tangible 
political dividend. The private sector must perceive the investment to be feasible and as a 
viable alternative way of making profit. 
 
4.2 Case study 1: Brazil and the industrialisation of agriculture  
 
Brazil underwent three major phases of industrial development and policy.  
 
The first wave lasted until 1980 and was characterised by extensive state-indicative planning 
in the areas of sectoral development (e.g. steel, petrochemical and renewable fuels policies) 
and trade protection (e.g. ad valorem tariffs and law of similarities). Industrial policy was aimed 




mainly at creating new industrial sectors, changing the prevalent pattern of specialisation in 
primary commodities and promoting technology-intensive activities. The main industrial policy 
strategy of this period was set up in the 1950s and consisted of the introduction of a 
protectionist regime based on ad valorem tariffs. The federal government had the discretionary 
power to control the level and types of imports. The Law of Similarities (Lei do Similar 
Nacional) stated that a product could only be imported if it could be proved that a similar 
product was not produced in Brazil. These measures were intensified during the period from 
1960 to 1980 within an import substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategy.  
 
Despite the controversial results of the ISI strategy, the Brazilian government also played a 
critical role in technological upgrading during this first phase (e.g. research in agro-
technologies within Embrapa and aircraft technologies deployed in Embraer). A number of 
state-owned enterprises in strategic manufacturing sectors were developed, such as 
Petrobras (1953), Usiminas (1956), Eletrobras (1962) and Embraer (1969), and a public 
development bank (BNDES) was established in 1952. A few years before, in 1942, the biggest 
Brazilian mining company, Vale do Rio Doce, was created as a state-owned enterprise (SOE) 
to operate mainly in the extraction of iron ore, the dominant mineral in Brazil. 
 
Some of these companies and institutions are today the pillars of the Brazilian industrial, 
financial and agricultural system. For example, the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) is 
the main provider of long-term finance in the country and one of the biggest in the world 
measured by assets, equity and disbursement (Ferraz et al., 2013). Embrapa is the largest 
research and development (R&D) agency in Latin America.  
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the debt crisis forced the Brazilian government to reduce its 
industrial policy interventions in favour of Structural Adjustment Policies and macroeconomic 
stabilisation. Structural adjustment policies were initially directed at trade liberalisation and the 
privatisation of public enterprises, while from the mid-1990s they increasingly focused on 
macroeconomic stabilisation (the ‘Real Plan’). During this second phase, the total number of 
special trade regimes and tariff rates were reduced and a significant number of public 
enterprises were privatised (for example, Vale do Rio Doce).  
 
The 2000s signalled the return of selective (sector-specific) industrial policies in Brazil. In 
November 2003, the first Lula government announced the Guidelines for an Industrial, 
Technology and Foreign Trade Policy (PITCE) aimed at increasing industrial competitiveness 
by boosting technological development in key sectors (semi-conductors, software, 
pharmaceuticals and medicines, and capital goods), thus promoting the export of higher value-
added products. This industrial policy was also complemented by technology policies and 
regulations aimed at advancing Brazil’s science and technology bases in biotechnology, 
nanotechnology and biomass/renewable energies. These technologies were considered 
critical to develop the oil and gas, agriculture, and pharmaceutical sectors. 
 
The implementation of this package of industrial and technology policies relied on specific 
financing programmes, such as Profarma (pharmaceutical) and Prosoft (software), as well as 
the integration of over 15 sectoral funds. In this way, the government managed to “align them 
[the funds] to government policies, eliminating duplication and scattershot initiatives” (ABDI 
2006:20), as well as divert resources towards applied industrial research (including pre-




competitive research), prototyping, and the commercialisation of innovation, problem-driven 
basic research, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). 
 
The PITCE was followed by an ambitious industrial policy package, called the Productive 
Development Policy (2008-2011), and the Plano Brazil Maior was launched in 2011.  
 
The Productive Development Policy (PDP) was structured around four challenges: First, 
sustaining the expansionary cycle by maintaining the rate of growth in Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation (GFCF) ahead of the GDP; second, upgrading and diversifying the export basket; 
third, fostering technological investment and innovation; and fourth and finally, restructuring 
the industrial system and supporting SMEs, as well national industrial drivers. The PDP is a 
complex industrial policy package aligned with specific macro-targets and comprising 425 
policy measures (organised into 34 programmes, including both ‘sectoral’ and ‘systemic’ 
actions). The sectoral actions expand PITCE’s targets along three main lines: ‘Mobilization 
Programmes in Strategic Areas’, ‘Programmes to Strengthen Competitiveness’, and 
‘Programmes to Consolidate and Expand Leadership’ (Kupfer et al., 2013). The management 
and implementation of this complex package of interventions has proven extremely 
challenging, and in some cases the lack of focus has negatively impacted upon the intended 
results. 
 
The Brasil Maior Plan (PBM) was launched in 2011, and signalled the last systematic attempt 
of the Brazilian government in recent history at implementing industrial policy. The ‘strategic 
map’ underpinning the PBM identifies four interdependent guiding principles/objectives. The 
first is strengthening critical competencies in terms of production capacity, corporate R&D and 
industrial skills; second is enhancing value chains by structural upgrading and re-organisation 
of production systems. Third, the PBM sought to expand both domestic and foreign markets 
beyond specialisation in primary goods, and finally also sought to expand the development of 
social and environmental sustainability. A number of different policy measures have been 
adopted to implement these guidelines. For example, the PBM strengthens production chains, 
diversifying/upgrading exports through tax relief, trade remedies (e.g. anti-dumping 
measures), financing, and loan guarantees for exporters (especially for SMEs). More short-
term measures have been integrated, as well as systemic and long-term measures like 
infrastructure development and demand-side interventions (e.g. the government procurement 
policy was updated). 
 
Over the years, Brazil’s industrial policy achieved important results in two major sectors, 
namely mining and agrobusiness. The models followed are very different, as the first one relied 
on a successful case of privatisation with a company – Vale – that managed to develop several 
linkages in the economy and boost the competitiveness of local production systems. The 
second one mainly centred on state-led long-term investments in the R&D&M of intermediate 
institutions.  
 
Mining is a strategic sector in the Brazilian economy, employing 2.2 million people and 
contributing significantly to the country’s export performance (minerals constituted 33% of total 
export in 2010) (ICMM, 2013). Iron ore companies also account for 65% of total tax revenues 
(Falco et al., 2011). The Brazilian Mining Royalty (CFEM) is paid to the federal government, 
which then distributes the revenues at state (12% of the amount) and municipality (65% of the 




amount) levels9. Vale is the second biggest company in Brazil and the world’s fifth largest 
mining firm, with annual revenues of US$33.2 billion. It is the leading mining firm, with 52.3% 
of domestic mineral production, and it operates in 13 different states across the country and 
in 37 countries around the world (Figueiredo & Piana, 2016). Vale played a key role in the 
regional development of the local production system. The company also established the Vale 
Technology Institute (VTI), which is the largest public-private research partnership ever 
achieved in Brazil (Falco et al., 2011). Through this institute, Vale is actively involved in 
different innovation development projects, public-private collaborations and supply chain 
initiatives. They set up and patented, in Brazil and in the United States, the first fully dry iron 
ore-tailing process, which was also adopted in the S11D mine. Previously, the flotation system 
that was used to raise the content of fine iron ore required an average of 1 000 litres of water 
per ton. This is a major innovation for mining, which is ranked second among water-
consumption industries (Mining News, 2016).  
 
Intermediate institutions: The Embrapa case study 
 
Over the last thirty years, Brazil has been among the most active countries in terms of its use 
of policies designed to expand natural resource-processing industries and food production. 
The results of these transformative policies are reflected in the remarkable results Brazil has 
achieved in manufacturing its agrarian change. Brazil is today among the top producers and 
exporters of orange juice, sugar, coffee, soya beans, beef, pork and chicken, as well as having 
caught up with the traditional big five grain exporters (USA, Canada, Australia, Argentina and 
the EU). At the centre of the transformative policy package implemented in Brazil is a network 
of intermediate institutes – e.g. Embrapa, which have fostered technological change, 
diversification and upgrading in agriculture and farming. 
 
Embrapa was founded in 1972 as a response to the main weaknesses of DNPEA (the National 
Agricultural Research and Experiment Department). These included “researchers’ lack of 
awareness of the basic needs of agriculture and the lack of intradepartmental and external 
interaction among researchers, extension workers, and farmers (which had led to instances 
of unproductive duplication of research efforts)”. Other weaknesses involved “the lack of 
incentives for researchers (particularly indicated by low salaries), the low level of postgraduate 
training (12 percent [of] the scientific staff at the time), and finally the insufficient, and often 
irregular financial resources available” (Beintema et al., 2001:16). Embrapa took over 
DNPEA’s extensive network of research institutes, covering the main agricultural commodities 
and regions, experiment stations and existing projects. Agricultural extension services were 
outside Embrapa’s area of intervention and were assigned to another agency, Embrater, which 
operated until 1991.  
 
During its first decades, Embrapa created a network of national commodity centres and 
regional centres that focused on major cropping and animal production systems, as well as 
on eco-regional and national themes. It also increased its internal capabilities by signing 
partnerships with American universities such as Purdue and Wisconsin, which allowed 
Embrapa’s staff to receive postgraduate training. In 1993, the establishment of the Embrapa 
                                               
9 A recent reform (2017) changed the royalty system, increasing the amount of royalties to be paid by 2%, 3% or 
4% depending on the company and the mineral. In addition, the basis of the calculation goes from the net revenue 
to the company’s gross revenues (from the second half of 2017). 




Planning System (SEP) for the first time introduced a systems approach to R&D planning. 
This allowed a redefinition and reintegration of the centre’s mission, objectives, programmes, 
human resources, infrastructural needs and priorities.  
 
From the late 1980s, agricultural research became even more cross-pollinated by research in 
advanced manufacturing. A good example of this is the satellite monitoring services for the 
acquisition and processing of remote sensor images and field data. The Satellite Monitoring 
Centre was created in 1989 in an area of 20 000 m2 in Campinas (Sao Paulo state), assigned 
by the Brazilian Army to Embrapa for the development of a special unit focused on territorial 
management systems and electronic networks for modern agriculture.  
 
Throughout the 1990s, Embrapa was involved in a wide range of activities related to 
agricultural research and technology including plant breeding, pest management, food safety, 
satellite monitoring, sustainable agricultural development, and hunger relief. Soybean 
breeding and pest management activities are headquartered at the Embrapa facility in 
Londrina in the state of Paraná, but crop research activities are carried out at locations around 
the country to develop crops and varieties that are suited for local conditions (Matthey et al., 
2004:10).  
 
The trend started in the 1990s continued during the next decade, in particular in 2005 and 
2006, when Embrapa made a serious effort to improve and renovate its infrastructure. 
Included among these investments, at the interface between agriculture, biotechnologies and 
advanced manufacturing, were:  
i) Facilities for quality improvement in the meat production chain;  
ii) An aquaculture laboratory prioritising water quality control, fish feeding and health; 
iii) A new Oenology Laboratory to boost wine production in the North-eastern Semi-
Arid Region;  
iv) The construction of one of the world’s first National Agribusiness Nanotechnology 
Laboratories focused on the development of sensors and biosensors for food 
quality control, certification and traceability. The Laboratory was also dedicated to 
the synthesis of new materials, such as polymers and nanostructured materials or 
thin films and surface-to-manufacture smart packages.  
v) The building on six new walk-in freezers to increase the storage and preservation 
capacity of the Embrapa Germplasm Bank (from 120 to 240 thousand seeds). 
 
Probably the most recent remarkable achievement of Embrapa has been the claiming of the 
Cerrado (the Brazilian savannah) for modern agriculture. It introduced “new varieties, cultural 
practices, zoning, tillage, biological fixation of nitrogen, development of livestock for both meat 
and milk, vegetables, fruit, irrigation and knowledge of the Cerrado natural resource basis” 
(Alves, 2010:70). Embrapa’s technological efforts were also reinforced by government 
investment, which established new universities and postgraduate courses in all states of the 
Cerrado region.  
 
Today, Embrapa includes 47 research centres (15 National ‘Thematic’ Centers, 16 National 
‘Commodity’ Centers and 16 Regional ‘Resource’ Centers) throughout the country. It hosts 
9 284 employees and has an annual budget of over US$1 billion. Similar to Fraunhofers in 
Germany, Embrapa plays a critical intermediary role between agricultural and manufacturing 
R&D, education, markets, and in-farm agricultural production. It also bridges and transfers 




knowledge, technical solutions and innovations across different sectors, thus facilitating 
various forms of inter-sectoral learning (Andreoni, 2014; Andreoni & Chang, 2014). According 
to information provided by the Brazilian government, Embrapa has generated and 
recommended more than nine thousand technologies for Brazilian farmers since its inception 
in 1973.  
 
4.3 Case study 2: China and the manufacturing of an innovation economy 
 
During the final two decades of the last century, China prepared its gradual transition to a 
market economy. Industrial policies were an integral part of China’s strategic five-year 
planning. Many initiatives and policy measures, especially in the early period, were inspired 
by the successful experiences of Japan and Korea. While the Sixth Plan (1981-1985) marked 
a more distinctive outward-oriented approach, focusing on importing technologies and 
developing endogenous capabilities, the government used the Seventh Plan (1986-1990) to 
establish an Industrial Policy Department under the State Planning Commission. In March 
1989, the concept of industrial policy was explicitly mentioned for the first time in an official 
document (the State Council’s paper, Decision on Current Industrial Policy Priorities). This 
was followed in March 1994 by the more comprehensive and integrated Outline of State 
Industrial Policies for the 1990s, which emphasised the development of mainstay and high-
technology industries, and the need to readjust the composition of foreign trade by 
strengthening manufacturing competitiveness.  
 
Strategic industries, or ‘pillar industries’, were identified based on their importance to China’s 
national security and economy (e.g. defence, coal, electric power and grid, 
telecommunications, petroleum and petrochemical, civil aviation and shipping) and growth 
potential (e.g. alternative-fuel cars, biotechnology, environmental and energy-saving 
technologies, alternative energy, advanced materials, new-generation information technology, 
and high-end equipment manufacturing). Each targeted sector received a policy package of 
complementary measures (e.g. tariff and non-tariff barriers, import quotas, local content 
requirements, licensing systems, tax exemptions, subsidised lands, and subsidised loans from 
state-owned policy banks) and relied increasingly on SOEs. The automobile and 
semiconductors industries, for example, were guaranteed market protection in exchange for 
technology transfer, while increases in companies’ production scale were reached through 
government-led mergers and acquisitions (Lo & Wu, 2014). 
 
At the firm level, China sought to develop a ‘national team’ of state enterprises in strategic 
industries (Nolan, 2001; Sutherland, 2003). SOEs benefited from incentives and preferential 
loan terms. Between 1998 and 2003, SOEs received 65% of all commercial bank loans, 
despite accounting for only 25% of China’s economy (Ferri & Liu, 2010:54). Imputed interest 
rates on debts offered to SOEs were also found to be 20% to 25% lower than that offered to 
private enterprises between 1999 and 2003 (Ferri & Liu, 2010:55).  
 
With legislation on bank loans having a significant industrial policy element,10 firms from 
prioritised industries benefited from subsidised loans drawn from state-owned ‘policy banks’, 
                                               
10 Chapter IV, Article 34 of the 1995 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks highlights that 
“[a] commercial bank shall conduct its loan business in accordance with the need for the development of the 
national economy and social progress and under the guidance of the state industrial policy”. 




such as the Export-Import (Exim) Bank of China, the Agricultural Development Bank of China 
(ADBC) and the China Development Bank (CDB). Today they are still critical industrial policy 
arms for the implementation of industrial policy. The overall financial infrastructure was also 
given a pro-industrial development vocation by law.  
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) policies were finally a key element in China’s industrial 
policies, alongside industrial consolidation policies and strategic mergers and acquisitions 
(e.g. China Electronics Corporation’s acquisition of Irico Group, a photovoltaic equipment 
manufacturer). The June 1995 Provisional Regulations of Guidance on Foreign Direct 
Investment mapped out guidelines for targeting FDI in desired high-technology sectors, and a 
list of encouraged, restricted or prohibited foreign investments was recorded in the Foreign 
Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue (‘National Catalogue’).11 Encouraged industries 
tended to involve high-end manufacturing, new and advanced technologies, energy efficiency 
and environmental protection.  
 
To facilitate technological transfers from more advanced economies, China offered tax 
incentives to entice foreign companies to establish R&D centres, and imposed technology-
import regulations and ownership restrictions. Conforming to the ownership restrictions, 
transnational corporations (TNCs) formed joint ventures with Chinese companies. Such joint 
ventures ultimately allowed the state to retain effective control over foreign affiliates so as to 
advance Chinese interests (Roehrig, 1994).  
 
Sectoral policies, industrial finance and FDI policies were also complemented by a new set of 
technology and cluster policies aimed at advancing domestic competencies in manufacturing 
and building integrated industrial systems. The Innovation Clusters programme was aligned 
with the development of National High Tech Zones (NHTZs) and Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs). The geographical distribution of public as well as private foreign investment was also 
centrally planned. Coastal areas, such as Guangdong and Fujian, were prioritised during the 
early days of the open-door policy while, more recently, inland areas have been the main 
targets of infrastructural investment. Emphasis was placed on developing clusters in different 
towns and cities, with unique pillar industries (e.g. Shunde specialises in electrical goods, 
while manufacturing towns such as Xiaolan specialises in locks and electronic acoustics and 
Guzhen in lighting fittings) (Zhang, 2013). 
 
China’s automobile industry offers an example of an industry that benefited from this complex 
package of industrial policies. Before the 1980s, the automotive industry largely comprised of 
SOEs, including First Automobile Works (FAW), Beijing Automotive Industry Corporation 
(BAIC), Dongfeng Motor Corporation and Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC). 
In the 1980s, the automotive industry was identified as one of China’s pillar industries that 
would drive its economic development. Although foreign investors benefited from tax 
exemptions and subsidised land, they were highly regulated, with local content requirements 
and joint venture rules with indigenous firms (foreign shareholding was capped at 50%). 
Examples of early joint ventures include BAIC and American Motors Company, and SAIC and 
Volkswagen. Using an infant industry strategy, import tariffs and quotas were imposed, with 
import tariffs reaching as high as 200% to 300% in the 1980s and 100% to 200% in the early-
                                               
11 Industries not listed in the published categories (encouraged, restricted and prohibited) were implicitly ‘permitted’ 
industries. 




1990s (Huang, 2003:260). It was only in the late 1990s that the government loosened entry 
restrictions on foreign automobile manufacturers.  
 
The market liberalisation agenda in the second part of the 1990s slightly downsized Chinese 
industrial policy efforts (agriculture, infrastructure, construction and services were included in 
the list of pillar industries). However, the Tenth Five Year Plan (2001-2005) marked the 
beginning of renewed systemic industrial and technology policy efforts.  
 
A number of other policy measures have been introduced since 2005 as part of the 11th and 
12th five-year plans. The policy model has increasingly relied on the involvement of provinces 
and municipalities, especially in the implementation of national plans such as those regarding 
sectoral policies. This is the case, for example, in the automotive sectoral policies (after 2011), 
as well as other industries like the photovoltaic sector. Policy coordination is achieved through 
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which drafts industrial plans for 
the State Council, but also collect inputs from the CCP Central Committee, and provincial and 
municipal governments (Dorn & Cloutier, 2013). As a result of this accelerated process of 
structural change and the new industrial policy approach, China has entered a path of 
indigenous innovation (zizhu chuangxin).  
 
A recent MIT study (Berger, 2013:145) has shown that, until 2005, there was limited evidence 
of domestic innovation capabilities. However, over the last four years, companies in high-tech 
sectors have developed scale-up capabilities (increasingly mastering the scale-up of complex 
system products and processes, translating into advanced product design and advanced 
manufacturing, and reducing the time to the market). Companies have also developed 
redesign, reverse and re-engineering competencies (re-assembling foreign components, 
changing functions, materials, and product characterisation). Thus these companies are 
increasingly able to produce products with “Japanese [good enough] quality at Chinese 
prices”, making them the most striking example of the success of China’s new industrialisation 
policies.  
 
Technology and R&D financing policies: The Innofund case study 
 
Since the 1980s, China has adopted several technology and R&D financing policies. In 1986, 
the National High-Tech Development Plan (also known as the 863 Plan) introduced the first 
articulated national technology strategy targeting biotechnology, space, information 
technology, laser technology, automation, energy, and new materials. Over the years, this 
technology plan was updated to include emerging technologies, such as telecommunications 
(1992) and marine technology (1996). Another programme, called the Torch Programme, was 
initiated in 1988. It promoted (i) hi-tech cluster development around Science and Technology 
Industrial Parks (STIPs), Software Parks, and Productivity Promotion Centers (Innovation 
Clusters); (ii) high-tech business start-up services (Technology Business Incubators); and (iii) 
financial services for innovation (Innofund and Venture Guiding Fund).  
 
The Innofund was set up in 1999 as a special government R&D programme. It aims to 
“facilitate and encourage the innovation activities of small and medium-technology based 
enterprises (SMTEs) and commercialization of research by way of financing, trying to bring 
along and attract outside financing for corporate R&D investment of SMTEs” (Innofund 
institutional website). The Innofund has precisely defined eligibility criteria and provides 




different types of financial support, targeting different types of companies at different stages 
of development – from loan interest subsidies to equity investment. 
 
To be eligible, companies must meet the following criteria: i) the project should comply with 
national industrial technology policies; ii) it should exhibit high potential for social and 
economic impact; and iii) it should be competitive in the market. Companies interested in 
applying for financing should be a business corporation with no more than 500 employees, 
30% of whom must have received higher education. Moreover, the company must also show 
that it has an annual R&D investment of at least 3% of total sales, and the number of 
employees dedicated to R&D should be at least equal to 10%. If the company is operating in 
an industrial sector with high economies-of-scale potential, it must also exhibit good economic 
performances. 
 
Among qualifying companies (Di Guo et al., 2016), the following projects are given priority:  
i. Projects with advanced technology content or independent intellectual property rights 
and high value added; 
ii. Projects established by researchers or oversees returnees interested in 
commercialising their scientific achievements; 
iii. Innovation projects jointly initiated by firms, universities and other research institutions; 
and 
iv. Projects that utilise new and advanced technologies to drive industrial restructuring in 
traditional sectors (especially stock assets revive) and job creation. 
 
Companies can apply for three different forms of financing. This is a key feature of this 
programme, as it allows for targeted industrial financing acknowledging different company 
financial needs. Innofund offers several forms of financing: 
 
i. Appropriation: is provided as start-up capital for small firms created and owned by a 
researcher with scientific achievement and potential for commercialisation of the 
innovation. 
ii. Partial subsidies: are offered to SMEs engaged in the development of a new product 
or the setting up of a new production pilot line. The total amount of subsidies is between 
one and two million renminbi (RMB) and firms are required to match the subsidy one 
to one.  
iii. Interest-free loans: are provided to SMEs interested in expanding and scaling up the 
production of innovative products as a substitute for commercial bank funding. 
iv. Equity investments: are only dedicated to investments in advanced technologies, for 
companies with high capacity and for products with high potential in emerging 
industries. Even when companies qualify for an equity investments, the latter should 
not be more than 20% of the registered capital of the investee firm. In some cases, the 
government can also provide bank loan insurance to improve financing terms from 
commercial banks. 
 
The governance structure of such articulated programmes relies on two levels of governance 
agencies.  
 
The Innofund Administration Centre (IAC) is the central authority under the Ministry of Science 
and Technology (MOST) and responsible for: i) the identification of the preferred application 




technology fields and industries and developing the application guidelines; ii) the ex-ante 
screening and evaluation of the applications; iii) releasing the contract with the selected firms; 
and iv) post-investment project assessment. All of these funding operations are also regulated 
and monitored by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), which approves the yearly budget, releases 
funding to the IAC twice a year and assesses its performance. The MOF and MOST produce 
joint annual reports on the Innofund programme to be reviewed by the State Council. 
 
At the local level, Innofund offices are distributed in each province and operate under the 
Provincial Science and Technology Committee. After 2005, the provincial offices received 
much more power from the Centre and were put in charge of performing many of the functions 
originally performed by the central IAC. In particular, before 2005, the provincial offices were 
simply recommendatory bodies and, when the central office approved a funding application, 
the provincial Bureau of Finance was expected to co-fund the allocated funding by 50%. After 
2005, the provincial committees have been increasingly involved in the project selection 
process, and a new application and screening system has also been introduced. Local 
Innofund offices have been given a 30% weight in the final decision made by the central IAC 
office, as part of a move towards more decentralisation and greater involvement of local 
government in decision making as well as funding. 
 
The exclusive ex-ante project screening performed by the central IAC presented two main 
challenges. First, the hierarchical system presented several inefficiencies and was relatively 
less transparent. Second, the central decision was potentially less effective, as local offices 
have a much better understanding of the local industrial conditions and opportunities. As a 
result of this de-centralisation, the policy process was also made more responsive and able to 
monitor the investments more closely. According to Guo et al. (2016), the system has become 
even more articulated since 2005, with provincial offices involving more agencies in the 
decision process and delegating decisions to lower levels. These innovations in the 
governance settlement have been particularly frequent in the most advanced regions, 
including Zhejiang. The governance de-centralisation has also been mirrored by an increasing 
shift from central transfer to local resources mobilisation. Since 2005, the provincial 
governments have increased their investments in the Innofund scheme six times. 
 
Between 1999 and 2011, Innofund provided more than 19 billion RMB to more than 30 000 
projects. A large majority of these were supported through appropriation (around 27 000), 
while all the others received several types of financial support, subsidy credits, bank loan 
insurance and equity investments. According to official reports, Innofund has a 1:11 multiplier 
effect in terms of inducing external financing, and has succeeded in the incubation of today’s 
world-leading companies, including the ICT giant Huawei. After only ten years of operation, 
82 of the 273 companies publicly listed on China’s SME Stock Exchange were former 













4.4 Case study 3: Malaysia and the diversification of the economy 
 
Industrial policy in Malaysia started in the second half of the 1960s with the Investment 
Incentives Act of 1968, when import substitution policies and SOEs development were aligned 
with a strong export promotion package of interventions (Lall, 1995; Rasiah & Shari, 2001)12.  
 
The need to coordinate a more articulated package of policies led to the establishment of the 
Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA), which was set up in the late 1960s. The 
authority played a key strategic role in the coming two decades, although problems in the 
coordination of policy interventions persisted.  
 
MIDA was the institution in charge of identifying and targeting strategic sectors for 
government. With a focus on semiconductors and other electronic components assembly, the 
electronics industry was highly labour intensive and allowed for short learning cycles in related 
electrical products, such as audio electric systems (Lee, 2013). MIDA targeted the 
semiconductor assembly industry and a number of US-based multinational corporations were 
offered a comprehensive package of incentives, including tax holidays and profit-repatriation 
guarantees. Many of these incentives were tied to investments in training, export performance 
and R&D activities. Incentive packages favoured export-oriented firms in particular. For 
example, the government supported duty drawback schemes along with export incentives 
offering double deduction benefits on corporate tax. Low wages and an English-speaking 
labour force also played an important role in attracting foreign companies. Finally, local supply 
chains were also promoted with the introduction of local content policy measures, especially 
for export-oriented manufacturers (Lall, 1995). 
 
The establishment of export-processing zones and industrial areas was also promoted in 
1971. One of these zones, based in Penang – the Bayan Lepas Export Processing Zone – 
was home to the first electronic industry in Malaysia. Many companies relocated their 
electronics plants to one of these zones in the following decade, leading to the establishment 
of local production systems around semiconductors and electronic components (Rasiah, 
2010). A number of these companies increasingly developed productive capabilities in higher 
technology and higher value-added products through continuous investments in skills and 
R&D activities.  
 
In 1990, Malaysia became the world’s largest exporter of semiconductors and amongst the 
largest exporters of disk drives, telecommunications apparatus, audio equipment, room air-
conditioners, calculators, colour televisions, and various household electrical appliances. 
More critically, by 1992, almost 90% of manufacturing of electronic products was being 
conducted by TNC affiliates (Athurkorala & Menon, 1999). The strategic integration into the 
electronics value chain had led to the development of a dense local production system made 
of specialised suppliers. 
 
                                               
12 In the early 1970, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was launched as a response to the socio-economic crisis and 
related racial conflicts in 1969, in particular high levels of poverty and inequality concentrated in the Malay 
population. One of the instruments introduced to address these conflicts and improve the economic situation of 
indigenous Malays (Bumiputera) was the establishment of new SOEs and, later, the transfer to Malay private 
ownership. As a result, from only 10 SOEs in 1957, by 1974 there were 82 SOEs in Malaysia, alongside 185 joint 
ventures with the private sector (Hui & Canak, 1981). 
 




Between 1970 and 1990, despite this export-oriented shift in industrial policy, Malaysia 
retained and expanded its public sector investments and retained import-substitution policies. 
The public sector financing of industrial investments peaked in this period, reaching almost 
30%. Among the targeted sectors were chemical and photographic supplies, transport 
equipment, electrical machinery, mineral products and precious stones. These and other 
manufactured items were subject to discretionary import licensing (WTO, 1997). 
 
Starting with the New Development Policy (NDP) in the second half of the 1980s until the mid-
2000s, Malaysia fully embraced the East Asian model pioneered in the region by Japan, and 
later by South Korea, Singapore and China. The Industrial Master Plans (IMP1 1986-1995, 
IMP2 1995-2006) targeted the development of heavy industries, including automobile and 
chemicals. These sectors were given import protection, and investments were made to 
develop more advanced technological capabilities. Specific attention was given to skills 
training, technical standards, and science and technology institutions through a technology 
action plan, which stimulated R&D in private enterprises. Finally, Technology Transfer 
Agreements (TTAs) were promoted to enable domestic firms to obtain the necessary 
technologies to meet international quality and process standards. During the period 1989 to 
1996, a total of 1 124 TTAs were approved by the MITI. Royalty payments were made in 467 
of these agreements, most of which concerned the electronics sector (WTO, 1997).  
 
To support and induce multinational corporations in EPZs to upgrade their operations and 
move towards higher value tasks, the government invested heavily in technical training. For 
example, in 1989, the government established the Penang Skills Development Corporation 
(PSDC). The steering committee was headed by three leading companies – Motorola, Hewlett-
Packard and Intel – and included another 24 ‘founder firms’ providing equipment, production 
technologies and highly skilled engineers and managers to teach at the newly established 
campus funded by the state of Penang. In 1996, the PSDC was ranked among the top ten 
workforce development institutions in the world, according to a USAID study. In the following 
years, Penang remained at the forefront of Malaysia’s global value chain integration and 
technological upgrading. Notably, in 2005 Penang was awarded cyber-city status as part of 
the Multimedia Super IT Corridor initiative. PDC was also renamed InvestPenang in 2004, and 
FDI investments in biotechnology, including medical devices, automation-based medical 
devices, instrumentation and diagnostic tools, were targeted. To keep pace with this 
technological upgrading, the PSDC founded an intermediate institution called the Micro-
electronic Centre of Excellence. 
 
The upskilling and advancement of the science and technology infrastructure proceeded hand 
in hand with targeted support of SMEs and local production systems. In 1993, for example, a 
soft loan policy for quality enhancement was introduced for Bumiputra-owned SMEs in the 
furniture and food-based industries. This was later extended to the automotive, electrical and 
electronics, plastics, machinery, engineering, and textiles sectors. Cluster-based industrial 
development programmes – such as the Industrial Linkage Programme (ILP) under the Small 
and Medium Industrial Development Corporation (SMIDEC) and the Vendor Development 
Programmes under the Ministry of Entrepreneur Development (MED) – were introduced in 
order to promote the use of locally made intermediate inputs through financial and technical 
assistance. 
 




MIDA also introduced a matching grant scheme to accelerate the shift of Malaysian-owned 
companies in targeted high value-added, high-technology innovation-based industries. The 
scheme, called the Domestic Investment Strategic Fund (DISF), matches companies’ 
investments with a 50% grant i) for training and R&D purposes; ii) to undertake outsourcing 
activities; iii) to comply with international standards; and iv) for licensing/purchase of 
technologies. These matching grants are also aligned with the sectoral industrial strategy, thus 
they privilege technological investments in renewable energy, advanced microelectronics, 
machinery and equipment, medical devices, pharmaceuticals and aerospace.  
 
Industrial policy remains a key part of Malaysia’s economic strategy today (Gustafsson, 2007; 
Jomo, 2007). In the Third Industrial Master Plan (IMP3), a broad planning blueprint for 
Malaysia’s economic strategy between 2006 and 2020, the strategic manufacturing and 
services sectors were identified for promotion and growth (MITI, 2006). This included the 
electrical and electronics, medical devices, textiles and apparel, machinery and equipment, 
metals and transport equipment industries. Malaysia is also targeting a broader manufacturing 
base with more high value-added industries, such as pharmaceuticals and transport 
equipment.  
Resource-based industries that were targeted included the petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
wood, rubber, palm oil and food-processing industries. The palm oil industry remains a key 
sector prioritised by the government in the medium term 
 
Diversification of the local production system: The case of palm oil 
 
Among the early industries picked by Malaysia’s government, the palm oil industry 
represented an example of an initially risky industry involving a non-native crop that eventually 
grew to achieve phenomenal international success. Malaysia accounts today for roughly half 
of the world’s production of palm oil. In the words of Rock and Sheridan (2007:191), “the 
government’s selective intervention in promoting smallholder palm oil production and the 
processing of crude palm oil may be the single most successful selective intervention in 
Malaysia”. 
 
In the 1960s, to diversify its traditional commodity export base, palm oil became the Malaysian 
government’s ‘crop of choice’ (Pletcher, 1991:625). As palm oil crops need to be milled within 
24 hours after harvesting, the government also identified and captured the opportunity to build 
strong linkages between agricultural and industrial production.13 A number of selective 
interventions were undertaken to grow internal capabilities and expanding the coverage of oil 
palm trees. 
 
First, to encourage landowners of rubber to switch to palm oil production, replanting grants 
were offered to finance the replanting of old rubber trees with oil palm from 1962. Such grants 
greatly lessened the financial burden on smallholders and estates arising from switching 
crops. Second, foreign-owned oil palm estates were acquired and developed by the state.14 
By the mid-1980s, the government had gained control of all the major plantations in Malaysia 
                                               
13 The manufacture of crude palm oil, refined palm oil and palm kernel oil is classified under the manufacturing of 
food products (Division 10) in the Malaysian Standard Industrial Classification (DOSM, 2008). 
14 Foreign-owned plantation companies were required to form subsidiaries domiciled in Malaysia. Majority 
ownership of these subsidiaries was then taken up by Malaysia’s economic development corporations – 
Permodalan Nasional (PERNAS) and, subsequently, Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB). 




(Pletcher, 1991:630). Such initiatives dramatically altered the composition of Malaysia’s 
output. Between 1960 and 1970, oil palm acreage (including replanted land and new 
plantations) grew by 13% p.a. (from 40 064 hectares to 135 570 hectares), leading to a 16% 
p.a. growth in output (from 90 000 tonnes to 396 000 tonnes) (Yusof & Bhattasali, 2008:5). By 
2012, the total planted area had expanded further by more than 37-fold to 5.08 million hectares 
(MPOB, 2013). 
 
The government provided strong institutional support and facilitated coordination between the 
public and private sectors by setting up the Palm Oil Registration and Licensing Authority 
(PORLA), the Palm Oil Research Institute of Malaysia (PORIM), and the Malaysian Palm Oil 
Promotion Council (MPOPC). PORLA, PORIM and MPOPC were responsible for regulation 
and licensing, specialised training and public sector R&D, and export promotion respectively. 
In 2000, to harness synergies between related functions, PORLA and PORIM were merged 
to form the Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB). 
 
Not merely content with the direct economic contributions of palm oil, the government actively 
sought to develop targeted downstream industries, such as the palm oil processing, 
oleochemicals,15 biotechnology, biodiesel and biomass industries (see Malaysia’s industrial 
master plans – MITI 1986, 1996 and 2006). Defying earlier sentiment that Malaysia lacked a 
comparative advantage in palm oil processing (see Little and Tipping (1972), for example), 
the government undertook a slew of targeted measures, including fiscal incentives and price 
distortions, to grow downstream capabilities.  
 
First, fiscal incentives were used to attract investments in strategic areas related to palm oil. 
Under the 1968 Investment Incentives Act, qualifying oil palm firms enjoyed two years of 
(renewable) corporate tax exemptions, and eight years of excess profit and development tax 
exemptions (see Rasiah, 2006). Pioneer status awards, offered before 1974, granted palm oil 
refineries tax exemptions for seven years.16 Tax exemptions were also offered on the basis of 
export performance and capital investments.  
 
Second, higher duties on crude palm oil exports and tax exemptions17 on processed palm oil 
exports greatly skewed producers’ incentives towards the latter. Following from this, the 1970s 
were characterised by significant price distortions in palm oil exports (Athukorala & Loke, 
2009).18 By 1994, Malaysia refined 99% of crude palm oil, a significant jump from 10% in 1975 
(Gopal, 1999:363). According to Jomo and Rock (1998), the export tax spurred the industry to 
upgrade its industrial and technological capabilities, and eventually to define the global 
technological frontier in palm oil refining.  
 
                                               
15 The oleochemicals industry includes basic oleochemicals (e.g. fatty acids and glycerine), oleochemical 
derivatives (e.g. fatty esters and metallic stearates), oleochemical preparations (e.g. soap and cosmetics) and other 
palm oil-based products (e.g. printing ink and polyols). 
16 Between 1969 and 1974, nine palm oil refineries received the pioneer status award (Rasiah, 2006:174). Pioneer 
status awards came under the auspices of the 1958 Pioneer Industry Ordinance. 
17 The extent of tax exemptions (full or partial) on processed palm oil exports depended on the degree of processing 
of the crude palm oil.  
18 During the periods 1970 to 1974 and 1975 to 1979, the nominal rates of assistance (NRAs), measuring the gap 
between domestic prices and free-market prices, were estimated to be -15.2% and -15.0% respectively (Athukorala 
& Loke, 2009:214). 




Third, bleaching earth, a key ingredient in the palm oil-processing industry, was initially 
subjected to tariffs and import quotas until internal production capabilities were built. However, 
to cap costs during the import-substitution phase, subsidies were provided such that the price 
of bleaching earth purchased by domestic industries was similar to world prices.  
 
Fourth, various policies dovetailed to promote the development of downstream industries. For 
instance, the 2006 Malaysian Biofuel Policy aimed to facilitate the gradual substitution of diesel 
fuel with palm oil. 
 
To promote the development of the palm oil industry, international restrictions on industrial 
policy were also occasionally circumvented. For instance, the Palm Oil Credit and Payment 
Arrangement (POCPA) scheme was introduced in 1992 to provide a two-year credit facility for 
countries purchasing palm oil from Malaysia.19 However, despite the IMF’s imposition of a 
three-month rule for clearing and repayment arrangements in 1994, US$500 million were still 
allocated to the POCPA scheme by 2002, with US$227 million of credit extended to nine 
countries, including Cuba and Pakistan (see Gustafsson, 2007:47-48).20 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks and Implications for South Africa 
 
This study assesses the development and industrialisation challenges facing South Africa as 
a middle-income country, moreover, as a country that is arguably caught in the middle-income 
trap. ‘Stuck in the middle’, South Africa – alongside a number of middle-income countries – 
has been unable to break out of its middle-income status. To the contrary, South Africa has 
been falling down global GDP rankings over a long period of time. Having previously had the 
highest income per capita of the group of comparator countries analysed here, South Africa 
has since been overtaken by Brazil and Malaysia, and China is set to overtake South Africa 
in 2018. Far from catching up with advanced economies, South Africa is itself being caught 
up with by other countries, including those that were previously of low-income status. 
 
This poor growth performance is concomitant with South Africa’s failure to take forward its 
industrialisation and to upgrade the structure of its economy. To the contrary, the country has 
experienced premature deindustrialisation. Our analysis of the global evidence on premature 
deindustrialisation benchmarks South Africa’s structural position and trajectory in the global 
context. The share of manufacturing in total employment in South Africa in 2015 is shown to 
be (a bit) below the share that would be predicted based on international patterns. Moreover, 
this share is falling further in South Africa, taking the country further below its predicted share.  
 
Adding to the concern about the quantitative share is the composition of South Africa’s 
manufacturing sector and exports. With some exceptions, the profile of South African 
manufacturing production and exports does not show the desirable patterns of structural 
transformation, which would include growth in domestic value added, movement up the value 
chain, and increasing focus on products that show potential for cumulative productivity 
increases and are demand-dynamic. South Africa is also lagging in terms of innovation and in 
                                               
19 Interest rates were determined by the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR). As part of the POCPA, barter 
and counter-trade arrangements could also be included. 
20 Other countries participating in Malaysia’s POCPA included Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iran, Iraq, 
Myanmar, North Korea and Sudan. 




the development and application of KETs that would enable the country to become competitive 
in the manufacture of complex products and to gain from the opportunities associated with 
Industry 4.0. 
 
Over the last years, South Africa has relied on several ambitious rounds of industrial policy, 
including sectoral targeting as in the case of the automotive industry. The international 
industrial policy experiences of countries like Brazil, China and Malaysia offer insights into the 
challenges associated with the implementation of different industrial policy tools and their 
coordination.  
 
The Brazilian case highlights the importance of promoting the development of public 
technology intermediaries supporting the absorption, adaptation and diffusion of technologies. 
The Embrapa case study is particularly important for middle-income countries, as it suggests 
opportunities for technological development and value addition at the agricultural-
manufacturing sectoral interface.  
 
The historical experience of China stresses inter alia the importance of long-term commitment 
and a staged approach to industrial transformation, especially with respect to technological 
advancement in the manufacturing sector. The Innofund is presented as a successful case of 
a funding scheme for technology policy. This specific case also shows the importance of 
supporting industrial policy implementation with responsive multi-governance institutions. 
 
The Malaysia case study points to the importance of a diversification strategy. Product and 
sectoral diversification is a key driver of sustained industrialisation and the development of a 
well-integrated domestic production system. The Malaysian experiences in the electronics 
industry and in palm oil emphasise the importance of developing production and technological 
linkages in the domestic economy, while integrating into global production networks. 
 
The lessons learned from the country cases reviewed in the paper point to three important 
policy recommendations.  
 
First, there are significant opportunities for value addition and technological development in 
agro-business value chains. The industrialisation of agriculture opens new venues for 
increases in productivity, upgrading in global markets and diversification. However, in order to 
capture these opportunities, public technology intermediaries must provide key technology 
and product services to reach product quality standards, and transform agricultural activities 
into highly productive industrial processes. 
 
Second, the promotion of technological upgrading in manufacturing industries cannot be done 
simply by jumping to frontier technologies – i.e. the so-called fourth industrial revolution. The 
China case study, in particular, emphasises how the building of a solid productive and 
technological capability foundation over several years is a precondition for innovation across 
several industrial fields. The other lesson is that institutions promoting technological innovation 
will have to change over time to respond to the changing nature of the innovation challenges 
firms face in the fast-changing global landscape. 
 
A third policy lesson is that, to increase value addition and value capturing in the domestic 
economy, countries need to target the development of their local production system. The 




building of integrated supply chains in the domestic economy gives countries sustained 
industrial and productivity growth. Therefore, industrial policy focusing on the attraction of a 
multinational or the setting up of an export-promotion zone must be fully coordinated with other 
policy measures that induce the real industrialisation process. 
 
Reversing premature deindustrialisation in South Africa will not result from the use of one of 
these instruments. Instead, it will depend on the coordination of a feasible set of interventions 
reinforcing each other in a coordinated manner. In particular, strategic forward integration and 
upgrading in global value chains is a complex process, as it entails both linking domestic 
players to foreign companies and markets, while at the same time building local supply chains 
of producers.  
 
The development of the local production system as a strategy to move beyond the middle-
income trap also requires engaging with technical change, especially taking into consideration 
the multiple cross-system applications of modern technologies. While manufacturing remains 
a cornerstone for re-industrialisation and technological development in South Africa, new 
value-addition opportunities can be found at the interface of the other economic sectors and 
the intersection of different technology systems. Well-coordinated and coherent industrial 
policy packages are critical in shaping this new industrial ecosystem in South Africa and 











Appendix 1: Premature deindustrialisation regression results 
 
Table A1 shows the econometric results upon which the analysis in section 3 is based. 
 
Table A1: Regression results 
 Dependent variable: Share of manufacturing in total 
employment (ln) 
 2005 2015 














R2 0.33 0.17 
n 148 148 
Note:  robust standard errors in parentheses below estimated coefficients. 
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